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Introduction
Despite apparently tight labor markets, wage infla-
tion in the late 1980s was much lower than most
observers anticipated. The Wall Street Journal
quoted one noted economist as saying, "The most
interesting phenomenon in the United States to-
day is the existence of enormous labor shortages
in some areas accompanied by no upward pres-
sure on wages."
1 The article went on to state that
the reasons for this phenomenon challenge the
assumptions about the relationship between wage
changes and general price changes that we formed
during the 1960s and 1970s.
Several explanations were offered at that time
for the slow nominal wage growth seen during
the second half of the decade. Chief among the
factors cited by labor-market analysts and the
media was a reversal in labor-management psy-
chology about wage increases, brought on in
part by slow productivity growth, a severe eco-
nomic downturn, and increased foreign compe-
tition. The common perception was that during
the 1970s, workers, with the consent of manage-
ment, felt entitled to automatic wage increases
that were at least in line with inflation. The
• 1 See Uchitelle (1987).
demand for "3 percent plus cost of living" was a
common refrain around many negotiating tables.
This mind-set evaporated as workers suffered
massive job losses during the twin recessions of
the early 1980s, and as managers faced mounting
foreign competition that eroded U.S. firms' market
share and placed downward pressure on domes-
tic prices. Instead of focusing on wage increases,
negotiations became centered on wage conces-
sions in exchange for job security.
In addition to a change in the psychology of
wage-setting behavior, institutional changes
were also cited as possible causes of sluggish
wage growth. Mitchell (1989), in comparing the
wage pressures of the 1980s with those of the
1960s, concludes that recent changes in labor-
market institutions have pushed wage-setting in
a more competitive direction. With the declines
in the proportion of workers in the union sector
and in big firms, jobs are less likely to be
cushioned from labor-market forces by union
contracts and bureaucratic personnel practices.
Changes in demographics, particularly the
greater participation of women in the labor
force, were also said to figure into the moderate
wage growth witnessed during the 1980s. To
the extent that women are less attached to the
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buffer by filling vacancies during tight labor
markets and by leaving the labor force during
slack periods.
The questions facing policymakers and
analysts during this period were twofold: What
was really behind the apparent change in wage
behavior, and was the shift permanent or tempo-
rary? In October 1989, the Federal Reserve Bank
of Cleveland sponsored a conference on the
causes and consequences of structural changes
in U.S. labor markets. Several prominent labor
economists were asked to provide a careful and
comprehensive analysis of some of the important
developments that took place during the 1980s.
The research focuses on a range of labor-market
behaviors and industrial relations practices that
could explain the macroeconomic relationship
between unemployment and wages, and also on
the effects of this relationship on output and
employment stability. Four of the six papers deal
with alternative compensation practices (fringe
benefits and lump-sum and profit-sharing pay-
ments) and the structure of union contracts. The
remaining studies examine how changing labor-
force demographics and increased pressure from




Was wage behavior different during the 1980s
than in the preceding two decades? This brief sec-
tion argues that this may indeed have been the
case. Many analysts have noted that nominal wage
growth during the expaasions of the 1980s fell far
short of that experienced during the upturns of
the 1970s and even of the 1960s (table 1). And the
same relatively low growth rates are also evident
for the broader measure of compensation per
hour, which includes fringe benefits, a growing
component of employee compensation.
This sluggish response alone might tempt
one to conclude that fundamental changes in
the structure of wage determination and worker
compensation during the 1980s dampened the
upward pressure on wages. However, leaping
to that conclusion ignores differences in eco-
nomic conditions across the past three decades.
Although observers in the 1980s generally per-
ceived labor markets to be extremely tight (par-
ticularly during 1988 and early 1989), typical
measures of labor-market tightness do not sup-
port this view. In fact, the minimum unemploy-
ment rate during the expaasions of the 1980sTABLE 2
Explaining Annual Percentage































































a. Year-over-year change, lagged one quarter.
b. Year-over-year change.
c. Variable equals one for quarters marked by recession.
NOTE: Observations are quarterly, and percentage changes are year over year.
Separate regressions were run for each decade. T-statistics are in parentheses.
SOURCE: Authors' calculations.
(5.2 percent) was higher than that of the up-
turns of the previous two decades (3.4 percent
during the 1960s and 4.8 percent during the
1970s). Moreover, the maximum rate of capacity
utilization was lower in the 1980s expansions
(84.4 percent) than during those of the 1960s
and 1970s (91-6 percent and 87.3 percent, respec-
tively). Thus, it is not clear whether the slow
wage growth of the 1980s stemmed from struc-
tural changes in wage-setting practices or simply
from differences in business conditions.
One way to partially disentangle these effects
is to ask the conceptual question, What would
have happened to wages if the expansions of all
three decades had shared the same economic
conditions and differed only in the relationship
between wages and changes in the economic en-
vironment? We use a simple econometric tech-
nique to estimate the wage behavior separately
for each of the last three decades. These estimates,
which summarize the link between wages and
economic conditions in each decade, are then
used to simulate the net nominal wage change
that would have taken place if wages had re-
sponded to similar conditions.
We follow a variant of the wage-change
model used recently by Wachter and Carter
(1989) and earlier by Gordon (1982).
2 Annual
changes in average hourly nominal earnings are
explained econometrically by annual changes in
the unemployment rate, capacity utilization, labor
productivity (measured by output per hour), the
GNP implicit price deflator, and the Consumer
Price Index (CPI, all items for urban workers).
Other specifications of the wage-change model
are possible, and many have been posited. Our
simple five-variable specification is based on
the premise that wages reflect both pressures in
the labor market and inflation expectations. We
use the CPI to measure expected price inflation.
Changes in the unemployment and capacity
utilization rates are assumed to proxy for shifts
in the tightness of labor and product markets.
Labor productivity changes measure workers'
contribution to production and, consequently,
employers' ability to grant higher wages. And
finally, the GNP implicit price deflator captures
shifts in producer prices, which also reflect
employers' ability to pay higher wages.
We estimate these relationships separately for
each decade using quarterly observations. We
also include a variable that takes the value of one
during quarters marked by national recessions to
account for business-cycle effects.
Because our main purpose is to demonstrate
wage behavior under similar economic condi-
tions, we do not dwell on the estimates of in-
dividual coefficients. Nevertheless, we note that
most of the variables in table 2 appear to have
the expected effect on nominal wage changes:
Higher nominal wage increases are generally
associated with stepped-up inflation expecta-
tions, increased capacity utilization, labor pro-
ductivity gains, and higher producer prices.
Although the positive relationship between
changes in nominal wages and unemployment
rates in the 1970s and 1980s is perhaps surpris-
ing, it is consistent both with periods of stagfla-
tion during the earlier decade and with the
long, gradual recovery of the 1980s, when wage
and price increases moderated and unemploy-
ment fell.
The net effects of these differences in the
relationship between nominal wage changes
and changes in economic conditions are shown
• 2 We present this specification simply as an illustration of the changes
sensed by analysts and practitioners during the 1980s. Individual coefficient
estimates from this exercise should be interpreted cautiously because of the
























NOTE: The values are the average annual percentage changes in nominal
hourly earnings during the decade. Simulations were performed by multiply-
ing the explanatory variables for a given decade by the coefficients for the
appropriate decade. The values on the diagonal (that is, for the same decade)
are identical to the actual annual wage changes.
SOURCE: Authors' calculations using estimates from table 2.
in table 3, The bottom row is of primary interest.
The first entry in that row is the average annual
nominal wage change that would have taken
place in the 1980s if labor had had the same
relationship to economic conditions then as in
the 1960s. In this hypothetical case, wages would
have increased an average of 6.43 percent
annually in the 1980s. Subjecting the wage be-
havior that prevailed during the 1970s expan-
sions to 1980s economic conditions yields a
slightly higher annual growth rate of 6.65 per-
cent. Both of these figures substantially exceed
the 4.24 percent average annual increase that
actually took place during the 1980s.
It is also interesting to note that if wages had
had the same relationship to economic conditions
during the 1960s as they did in the 1980s, wage
growth would have been considerably lower in
the earlier decade than it actually was (3.65 per-
cent versus 5.41 percent). The same holds true for
the 1970s. The actual annual wage increase was
7.51 percent, compared with 6.97 percent when
the 1980 wage structure is used.
This simple analysis suggests that something
dampened the relationship between wages and
economic conditions during the 1980s, such as
changes in unemployment rates and in price
levels. The papers summarized below explore the
various shifts that have taken place and consider
their implications for both wage behavior and the
performance of the U.S. economy.
II. Why the Slow
Wage Growth in
the 1980s?
The explanations explored at this conference for
the slow wage growth of the 1980s can be
grouped around three phenomena: increased
international competition, changes in wage-setting




The first category considers increased competition
within product markets, particularly that resulting
from greater penetration of foreign imports into
U.S. domestic markets. Under this scenario, pres-
sures to keep prices in line with those of foreign
competitors would moderate wage increases.
Susan Vroman and Wayne Vroman address this
issue in "International Trade and Money Wage
Growth in the 1980s." Their focus on international
trade as a significant contributor to sluggish wage
growth is well supported by the events of the
1980s. The U.S. economy has become increasingly
open to foreign trade with respect to both imports
and exports. As imports further penetrate our
product markets, one would also expect labor
markets to become more competitive, coastraining
domestic nominal wage growth.
The authors present two sets of estimates to
test this hypothesis. The first is based on a time-
series analysis of a modified Phillips curve,
which shows the trade-off between nominal
wage growth and unemployment. The second
is based on a longitudinal study of more than
2,000 collective bargaining agreements in the man-
ufacturing sector between 1959 and 1984. Both
sets of estimates show that developments in inter-
national trade in the 1980s contributed to the slow-
down in money-wage inflation, with nonpetroleum
import prices and real nonpetroleum import share
registering the most significant effects. The authors
are quick to point out, however, that international
trade accounted for only a small part of the slow-
down, at most 18 percent in selected years. This
contribution would have been even less significant
for the private business sector as a whole, since in-
ternational trade should have the largest impact on
manufacturing, a sector that directly involves only
one-fifth of U.S. workers.
Vroman and Vroman place the estimated
trade effect into perspective by exploring other
possible explanations for the modest wage
growth of the 1980s. Most important among theseare inflationary expectations and the composi-
tion of unemployment. The authors conclude
that, of the factors considered, the reduction in
inflationary expectations during the latter half of
the decade was the primary factor in the slower
nominal wage growth. The unusually high rate of
unemployment among prime-age males was also
found to exert a restraining effect on money-wage




The second class of explanations relates to institu-
tional changes in wage-setting practices. These in-
clude alternative forms of compensation, such as
lump-sum payments, profit sharing, and fringe
benefits. Also covered are changes in the staicture
of labor union contracts, such as contract dura-
tion, cost-of-living indexation, and the emphasis
on job security over wage growth.
As documented below, workers have increas-
ingly received compensation in forms other than
cash wages. For instance, the percentage of
workers receiving lump-sum or profit-sharing
payments has risen over the last decade. Fringe
benefits as a share of total compensation has
also increased, although a slightly smaller pro-
portion of workers are now covered by pen-
sions and health care benefits—the two largest
components of this form of payment. Moreover,
the prevalence of cost-of-living indexation fell dur-
ing the 1980s, while contract length grew. A theme
shared by all four papers summarized in this sec-
tion is that developments in wage-setting pro-
cesses may have reduced the trade-off between
wage inflation and unemployment.
Lump-Sum Payments. In "Lump-Sum Payments
and Wage Moderation in the Union Sector," Linda
Bell and David Neumark examine the growth of
lump-sum payments in union firms in an effort to de-
termine whether the spread of this alternative com-
pensation arrangement contributed to the decline in
wage growth during the past decade. Lump-sum
payments can reduce wage inflation in at least three
ways. First, they may signal a change in the labor-
management environment toward either a strength-
ened management stance or a worker preference
for that form of payment. Second, they may simply
reflect an accounting change as certain labor costs
are shifted out of wages and salaries and into other
forms of compensation. Third, they may increase
labor-market flexibility by tying compensation
more directly to worker productivity and to firm
profits. Profit sharing provides employers with a
method for responding to shocks in the product
market beyond simply adjusting employment.
Since profit-sharing payments are not counted as
part of an employee's base salary, adjustments in
either direction can be made quickly in response
to changing business conditions. This increased
flexibility has led some economists, including
Weitzman (1986), to advocate profit sharing as a
means of stabilizing employment and output.
To analyze these effects, Bell and Neumark ex-
amine more than 5,000 contracts negotiated in
1,200 private-sector establishments between 1975
and 1988. Within this sample, they find a dramatic
jump in the number of contracts with lump-sum
payment provisions. Indeed, between 1983 and
1984, the proportion of workers signing such con-
tracts skyrocketed from 5.9 percent to 69.5 per-
cent! The authors present evidence that this surge
resulted from unions' preference for this alterna-
tive form of compensation.
Applying the Phillips-curve framework to the
trade-off between nominal wage increases and un-
employment, Bell and Neumark find that the prev-
alence of lump-sum payments is associated with
reduced wage growth. They estimate that a 10-
percentage-point rise in the share of workers cov-
ered by lump-sum contracts pushes the annual
rate of wage inflation down 0.3 to 0.4 percentage
point. The authors then reject all but one of the
aforementioned explanations for this dampening
effect. They dismiss the accounting explanation of
a shift from base wages by showing that lump-
sum payments also reduce the percentage in-
crease in firms' total labor costs. Likewise, they
find little support for the flexibility explanation. In
fact, their estimates are inconsistent with the
hypothesis: Firms offering lump-sum payments ex-
hibit less labor-cost flexibility in response to
changes in demand for their products. The authors
conclude that the labor-management environment
must have changed during the 1980s.
Profit Sharing. Douglas Kruse explores the
effect of a second form of nonwage payment—
profit sharing—on wage growth. In "Profit Sharing
in the 1980s: Disguised Wages or a Fundamentally
Different Form of Compensation?" he points out
that even this somewhat narrow type of com-
pensation takes several different forms, includ-
ing profit-related bonuses, deferred pension
plans, or some combination of the two. Results
of his study show a steady growth in deferred
profit sharing, as the percentage of the private
wage and salary work force with such coverage
rose from 13-3 percent in 1980 to 18.4 percent in
1986. Although this still represents a relatively
small share of the total labor force, the covered
workers appear to be concentrated in industriesthat have historically demonstrated downwardly
rigid wage behavior, such as manufacturing.
Kruse concentrates on increased labor flexibil-
ity to explain the negative relationship between
profit sharing and wage growth—a relationship
that is similar to the one between lump sums and
wages described by Bell and Neumark. He re-
views the empirical literature on the connection
between profit sharing and employment stability
and finds little agreement among the studies.
Kruse also pursues his own empirical test using
deferred pension plans as a measure of profit shar-
ing. His analysis yields some support for the posi-
tion that firms do not view profit-sharing payments
as part of the short-am cost of labor, but rather as
a distribution of profits to labor after other costs
(including base labor costs) have been taken into
account. In this way, a company's employment
decisions are not influenced by profit-sharing pay-
ments, since these are not considered part of base
wages. For 586 publicly traded U.S. companies,
Kruse notes little trade-off between higher profit-
sharing payments and employment. On the other
hand, he does find the expected trade-off be-
tween base wages and employment. The author
concludes that profit sharing is not simply "dis-
guised wages," but a more flexible form of
employee compensation.
Fringe Benefit Coverage. In "The Decline of
Fringe-Benefit Coverage in the 1980s," Stephen
Woodbury and Douglas Bettinger suggest that
compensation became more flexible during the
last decade because a lower percentage of
workers received employer-based health in-
surance coverage and pension plans. The share
of workers included in employer-provided pen-
sion plans dropped from 60 percent in 1979 to 55
percent in 1988. During the same period, the per-
centage of workers covered by employer-provided
group health insurance plans shrank slightly, from
74 percent to 72 percent. As a result, the ratio of
employer costs for these two fringe benefit pack-
ages to wages and salaries edged down. These
statistics suggest that the moderate wage growth
in the 1980s was not necessarily due to large off-
setting increases in benefit coverage. However,
the reduced coverage may have led to more flex-
ible compensation.
Woodbury and Bettinger's primary purpose
is to provide a detailed analysis of the determi-
nants of fringe benefit coverage. They conclude
that the decline in coverage during the 1980s
resulted both from the decrease in marginal tax
rates on personal income during the middle of
the decade and from the steady drop in union rep-
resentation throughout the decade. Dwindling
manufacturing employment, shifts in occupa-
tional mix, and aging of the work force had little
to do with the decrease in coverage, according to
the authors.
The most significant determinant was the low-
ering of marginal tax rates in 1986, which induced
workers to trade fringe benefits for increased
wages. However, their willingness to substitute
wages for fringes was not unifonn across all types
of voluntary benefits. Woodbury and Bettinger
estimate that workers were more willing to trade
wages for employer-provided pensions than for
employer-provided health coverage. The authors
interpret the decline in benefit coverage as a ten-
dency for a reduction in the fixed component of
worker compensation, which can be seen as a
move toward a more "spot market" type of pay.
Union Contracts. Wage moderation in the
1980s was disproportionately concentrated in the
union sector, which experienced lower wage
growth in the latter half of the decade (14.2 per-
cent) than did the nonunion sector (23.9 percent).
In contrast, in every year between 1976 (when
data first became available) and 1982, union wage
hikes outpaced nonunion wage changes. After
1982, when the economy began to recover from
the high unemployment brought on by the twin
recessions that inaugurated the decade, many
unions placed job security above wage growth as
the top priority in their bargaining rounds. This
reordering is certainly evident in unions' nominal
wage increases.
In "Indexation and Contract Length in Union-
ized U.S. Manufacturing," Mark Bils examines two
changes in the staicture of labor contracts that
could have led to slower wage growth in the
union sector: reductions in indexation and shorter
contract length. For all union contracts settled in
the private sector, the proportion of workers with
inflation escalator clauses fell from an average of
55.2 percent between 1980 and 1983 to 36.8 per-
cent between 1984 and 1988. However, the length
of contracts remained the same over the decade,
averaging slightly more than 31 months.
An extensive body of theoretical literature
supports the view that the length of contracts
and the inclusion of indexation reflect the de-
gree of uncertainty facing workers and employ-
ers. To explore this proposition, Bils examines a
detailed longitudinal set of major collective bar-
gaining agreements reached between 1955 and
1985 in the manufacturing sector. His results con-
tradict the generally accepted prediction that
increased uncertainty will shorten contracts. Rather,
he finds that contracts are longer in industries that
face more uncertainty (durable goods, for example).
Bils suggests that these results are consistent withthe notion that longer contracts are written in
order to reduce strikes.
With respect to indexing, he finds that the per-
centage of contracts with cost-of-living escalator
clauses is positively related to increases in both in-
flation and inflation uncertainty. This is consistent
with the generally accepted view that escalator
clauses protect workers from unanticipated price-
level changes. Consequently, consumers' lower
inflation expectations during the latter halt of the
1980s could explain the lower nominal wage
growth at that time. This finding is in accord with
Vroman and Vroman's results.
Demographic Shifts
In "Gender Differences in Cyclical Unemploy-
ment," Sanders Korenman and Barbara Okun con-
sider the effect of female participation in the work
force on cyclical unemployment. It may be that
women provide a pool of workers who move
freely into and out of the labor force (depending
on the stage of the business cycle), since they are
historically less attached to it than are men. Such a
procyclical participation pattern of a large group
of workers would weaken the effectiveness of un-
employment rates as a measure of labor-market
tightness. Consequently, fluctuations in wages and
in standard measures of unemployment rates asso-
ciated with business cycles would be dampened.
The major issue that Korenman and Okun ex-
plore, therefore, is whether women are indeed
less attached to the labor force than are men.
Their analysis shows that although women are
still less attached, their connection grew during
the 1980s.
These results might suggest that cyclical
unemployment should rise in response to in-
creased labor-force attachment among women,
but further analysis shows no association be-
tween these two factors. The authors attribute
this to the disparate distribution of the sexes
across industries and occupations. Women's
employment is disproportionately concentrated
in growth industries that demonstrate little cycli-
cal fluctuation, while men are concentrated in
industries with the opposite characteristic. Thus,
although Korenman and Okun do not rule out
the possibility that the increase in female labor
supply during the 1980s reduced wage growth
by lowering labor-market tightness, their find-
ings suggest little, if any, change in the long-run




Two prominent macroeconomists, Olivier
Blanchard and Finn Kydland, were invited to
the conference to comment on whether the find-
ings of the papers summarized above alter the
way in which labor markets figure into their
view of the workings of the macroeconomy. In
particular, we were interested in whether the
trend toward more flexibility and risk sharing in
wage-setting practices would alter their theories
and policy recommendations.
Blanchard's remarks focus primarily on the
macroeconomic implications of lump-sum
bonuses and profit sharing. He sees both
schemes as ways of lowering the risk of bank-
aiptcy among firms, and notes an interesting
tension between the implications of increased
risk sharing in labor contracts and of recently
introduced financial arrangements, such as high-
yield junk bonds. The former generally provides
greater stability by reducing the likelihood of
bankaiptcy, while the latter raises the chances
of a firm going under.
Blanchard argues that the reduction in bank-
aiptcy risks has had three macroeconomic effects:
1) stabilization of employment in the short ain, 2)
alteration of the factors determining labor mobil-
ity, and 3) modification of the Phillips-curve speci-
fication. The first effect results from the simple fact
that Finns will not be as likely to close their doors
during downturns and, through wage adjustments,
will be able to retain workers longer. This should
reduce employment swings during business
cycles. The second effect is related to labor adjust-
ments that follow sectoral shocks. If wages are
rigid, then declining employment is the only sig-
nal that leads workers to leave hard-hit sectors.
However, if wages vary, then both they and job
security enter into a worker's decision. Finally, an
increase in wage flexibility breaks the link be-
tween tightness in the labor markets (as measured
by unemployment rates) and price inflation.
Kydland frames his remarks in terms of im-
plications for business-cycle theory. He notes
that many researchers interested in this line of
inquiry have changed their methodology from
the system-of-equations approach popular in
the 1960s to one based on the neoclassical
growth model. Under the fonner framework,
models are constaictecl around equations that
describe aggregate economic behavior, such as
wage rates, unemployment rates, household con-
sumption, and business investment. In contrast,
the approach based on the neoclassical growth
model stresses the use of empirical knowledge toobtain parameter estimates for technology, pref-
erences, and instiaitional arrangements. These
parameter estimates provide realistic calibra-
tions for simulation models intended to mimic,
and thus explain, macroeconomic phenomena.
Consequently, this traasition to the use of the
neoclassical growth model as the basis of macro
economic analysis is important in detennining how
questions are posed and data are organized.
Kydland finds that research presented in this
volume is, for the most part, organized around the
former methodology—that is, based on estimates
of aggregate behavioral equations. He stresses that
in order to bridge the gap, questions posed in the
business-cycle framework will have to be translated
into the behavioral-equation framework, and vice
versa. Therefore, business-cycle researchers may
have to ask slightly different questions or else organ-
ize the information presented at this conference in a
different way if they are to incorporate these find-
ings into their research.
IV. Conclusion
The research presented at this conference under-
scores the thinking of many observers and market
analysts who, during the latter half of the 1980s,
perceived that developments were taking place in
labor markets that altered certain basic relation-
ships between wage behavior and economic per-
formance. These essays suggest that the increased
adoption of more-flexible pay schemes during the
latter half of the decade led to lower labor costs,
perhaps to more flexibility for firms in their em-
ployment decisions, and, in general, to more sta-
bility in employment (at least in the short am).
Thus, evidence indicates that these more flexible
pay schemes might be able to accommodate rela-
tively lower unemployment rates without igniting
serious wage inflation.
Although some observers argue that this in-
creased flexibility, which stemmed from the adop-
tion of lump-sum payments and profit-sharing
arrangements, is simply a way to obscure wage-
concessions, the research presented here finds
little support for this view. The fairly widespread
acceptance of these alternative compensation
practices by both workers and managers suggests
that the shift in the relationship between labor
markets, unemployment, and price inflation
observed in the 1980s may extend well into the
1990s. This structural change, along with other
changes noted at the conference, may be wel-
comed by policymakers attempting to contain in-
flation while simultaneously stabilizing output.
References
Bell, Linda, and David Neumark. "Lump-Sum
Payments and Wage Moderation in the
Union Sector," in Randall W. Eberts and Erica
L. Groshen, eds., Structural Changes in U.S.
Labor Markets. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe,
Inc., 1991, pp. 45-62.
Bils, Mark. "Indexation and Contract Length in
Unionized U.S. Manufacturing," in Randall W.
Eberts and Erica L. Groshen, eds., Structural
Changes in U.S. Labor Markets. Armonk:
N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1991, pp. 145-71.
Blanchard, Olivier Jean. "Macroeconomic Impli-
cations," in Randall W. Eberts and Erica L.
Groshen, eds., Structural Changes in U.S.
Labor Markets. Armonk: N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe,
Inc., 1991, pp. 201-05.
Gordon, Robert J. "Inflation, Flexible Exchange
Rates, and the Natural Rate of Unemploy-
ment," in Martin N. Baily, ed., Workers, Jobs,
and Inflation. Washington, D.C.: The Brook-
ings Institution, 1982, pp. 89-155.
Korenman, Sanders, and Barbara Okun. "Gender
Differences in Cyclical Unemployment," in Ran-
dall W. Eberts and Erica L. Groshen, eds., Struc-
tural Changes in U.S. Labor Markets. Armonk:
N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1991, pp. 177-95.
Kruse, Douglas. "Profit Sharing in the 1980s:
Disguised Wages or a Fundamentally Dif-
ferent Fomi of Compensation?" in Randall W.
Eberts and Erica L. Groshen, eds., Structural
Changes in U.S. Labor Markets. Armonk:
N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1991, pp. 67-99.
Kydland, Finn E. "Macroeonomic Implications,"
in Randall W. Eberts and Erica L. Groshen,
eds., Structural Changes in U.S. Labor Mar-
kets. Armonk: N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1991,
pp. 207-13.
Mitchell, Daniel J.B. "Wage Pressures and Labor
Shortages: The 1960s and the 1980s," Brook-
ings Papers on Economic Activity, vol. 2
(1989), pp. 191-231.
Uchitelle, Louis. "Wage Increases Are Sluggish
despite a Scarcity of Workers," The Wall
Street Journal, September 1, 1987, p. Al.Vroman, Susan, and Wayne Vroman. "Interna-
tional Trade and Money Wage Growth in
the 1980s," in Randall W. Eberts and Erica L.
Groshen, eds., Structural Changes in U.S.
Labor Markets. Arrnonk: N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe,
Inc., 1991, pp. 13-40.
Wachter, Michael L., and William Carter. "Norm
Shifts in Union Wages: Will 1989 Be a Replay
of 1969?" Brookings Papers on Economic Ac-
tivity, vol. 2 (1989), pp. 233-64.
Weitzman, Martin L. "Macroeconomic Implica-
tions of Profit-Sharing," in Stanley Fischer,
ed., NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1986.
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1986.
Woodbury, Stephen A., and Douglas R. Bettinger.
"The Decline of Fringe-Benefit Coverage in
the 1980s," in Randall W. Eberts and Erica L.
Groshen, eds., Structural Changes in U.S.
Labor Markets. Armonk: N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe,
Inc., 1991, pp. 105-38.